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ARE EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES IN
AIRPORT PASSENGER SCREENING
REASONABLE UNDER THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT?
Sara Kornblatt*
I. INTRODUCTION
September 11, 2001 ushered in a new era in a multitude of ways.
At the forefront is the issue of airport security and passenger
screening. The United States faces the task of protecting our
citizens, our buildings, our skies, and our country from another
attack similar to that harrowing day that changed America forever.
Technologies have emerged to help thwart a future strike. Airports
across the nation have started to implement some of these
technologies. Americans now may be subject to "backscatter x-
rays"' and "explosive trace portals ' 2 prior to boarding aircraft at our
nation's airports. These tools present a tenuous balancing act
between the need for national security and citizens' constitutional
rights against warrantless searches and seizures as afforded by the
Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches
and seizures. 3  What amounts to "unreasonable" is the ultimate
question. This note will examine modem society's definition of
"unreasonable" as it relates to the limits placed on technology by the
* J.D. Candidate, May 2008, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Graphic Design,
Wittenberg University. My great appreciation to Professors Susan Smith Bakhshian and John
Nockleby for their thoughtful input, all of the editors and staff of Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review for their hard work, and my family for their unwavering support.
1. Backscatter x-rays are an emerging passenger screening technology, which can produce
an image of a person's body and the objects they are carrying underneath their clothing. See infra
Part II.D.
2. Explosive trace portals are machines used to detect trace amounts of elements used in
explosives emanating from a passenger's body or clothing. See infra Part II.C.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Fourth Amendment. This note will also scrutinize two specific
airport passenger screening technologies and where they fall on the
reasonableness scale. While the answer may be that our Fourth
Amendment protections are impacted by these technologies, this note
will also look at whether the definition of "unreasonable" has been
affected by a climate of fear; thus, what may have seemed
unreasonable before September 1 1th may now be deemed
reasonable. In addition, this note will examine search methods that
filter into general society once they become ubiquitous in airports.
Part II will explore the evolution of airport passenger screening. Part
III will trace the evolution of the Fourth Amendment through case
law and the "special needs" doctrine as it relates to passenger
screening. Part IV will apply current law to the current and
emerging screening technologies and will analyze their
constitutionality. Ultimately, this note will argue that while
backscatter x-rays and explosive trace portals are useful secondary
screening tools, they are unreasonable searches when used for
primary passenger screening. Finally, Part V will present a possible
resolution to the dilemma created by our need for security and our
desire for privacy yet will conclude that certain technology may
remain too invasive to be labeled reasonable.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF PASSENGER SCREENING TECHNOLOGY
A. Background and Purpose
Airline passenger screening originated as a preventative tool
against airline hijackings during the late 1960s and early 1970s.4 On
September 11, 1970, a date that is eerily coincidental, President
Nixon set forth a plan to combat airplane hijacking.' The program
required the airlines to develop inspection methods and install
surveillance equipment at all appropriate U.S. airports.6 As a result,
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) established the Anti-
Hijacking program.7 U.S. airlines worked with the Departments of
4. COMM. ON COMMERCIAL AVIATION SEC. ET AL., AIRLINE PASSENGER SECURITY
SCREENING: NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 1, 6 (1996).
5. Id. at 6.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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Defense and Transportation to ascertain whether military x-ray
machines and metal detectors could help prevent hijackings.8
The FAA issued a rule on February 1, 1972, dictating that air
carriers must screen all passengers using behavioral profiling,
magnetometers, identification checks, physical searches, or some
combination of these systems. 9 Unfortunately, hijackings did not
abate; on December 5, 1972, the FAA announced emergency rules
mandating screening of all passengers and carry-on baggage for
passenger flights. ° This program required airlines to implement
security systems that would prevent passengers from bringing
weapons, explosives, and incendiary devices onto an airplane." The
primary focus of these screenings was, and continues today to be,
metallic objects. 12  However, as turmoil throughout the world
increased and U.S. airlines became even more attractive to
international terrorists, the FAA recognized the need to expand
airport screening systems. 3 The capacity to detect different types of
metals, as well as plastic explosives and other threatening materials,
has become a necessity.
4
B. Magnetometers (Metal Detectors)
A magnetometer is an electronic metal detector resembling a
door frame. 5 A person who walks through the portal passes through
a magnetic field, activating a warning light or signal. 6 Metal
detection portals produce a magnetic field that generates eddy
currents in metallic or ferromagnetic objects that pass through the
portal. 7 If a passenger carries metal through the portal in an amount
equal to or greater than the calibration of the detector, eddy currents
are created. 8 When the eddy currents are detected, an alarm sounds
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See id.
14. Id.
15. Gibson v. State, 921 S.W.2d 747, 752 n.1 (Tex. App. 1996).
16. Gibson, 921 S.W.2d at 751-52.
17. COMM. ON COMMERCIAL AVIATION SEC. ET AL., supra note 
4
, at 13.
18. Id.
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and screening personnel step in to determine if in fact a dangerous
object or weapon is present. 9
The science behind the operation of the magnetometer is built
upon the fact that a magnetic field, made up of lines of flux, encircles
the earth." Since steel and other ferromagnetic metals conduct better
than air, metal will bend the flux lines as the lines seek the path of
least resistance by passing through the metal rather than the air."
When distortions happen near a "fluxgate magnetometer," a signal is
created which can detect the magnetic disturbances."
C. Trace Detection Technologies
Trace detection entails inferring the presence of explosives or
other dangerous substances from air or material samples physically
collected from bodies or clothing.23 As of September 2006, thirty-
seven U.S. airports utilized trace detection machines known as
"puffers. ' ' 24 A puffer is a tall, transparent tube that a person steps
into.2 ' Rapid blasts of air ("not quite enough to ruffle the hair"26)
dislodge trace particles from the person's skin and clothes, sucking
them into a filter to be instantly analyzed to determine if that person
has been in the presence of explosives or narcotics 7.2  The entire
process takes approximately fifteen seconds.28  Currently, this
technology is only being used by the Transportation Security
Administration ("TSA") as a secondary inspection for passengers
selected for further screening.29
19. Id.
20. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. at 1085.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. COMM. ON COMMERCIAL AVIATION SEC. ET AL., supra note 4, at 4, 16-19.
24. Scott Lindlaw, Airport Screening Technology Developed, AP ONLINE, 9/8/06 APWIRES
21:24:07 (Westlaw).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Airport Screening Technology: Full Exposure, ECONOMIST, Aug. 19, 2006, at 21; see
also Lindlaw, supra note 24.
28. Eric Lipton, Screening Tools Slow to Arrive in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2006, at 22.
Puffers were developed by Sandia National Laboratories in 1997 and are manufactured by
General Electric and Smiths Detection. Id. They are the only machines that automatically
examine a person from head to toe for residue from explosives. Id.
29. Alex Halperin, Airport Security Goes High-Tech, BUS. WK., Aug. 10, 2006, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/contentlaug2006/tc20060810_208055.htm.
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There is some concern that puffers could produce false-
positives, which would slow down airport screening lines if the
machines were used as a primary screening tool." For example,
fertilizer can be used as a bomb ingredient, and someone who spread
fertilizer on a lawn and went to the airport without changing shoes
would be identified by the puffer as having residue from explosive
materials.3 Another drawback to using puffers for primary screening
is that they cannot detect liquid explosives, which are attractive to
terrorists, as recent events demonstrated.32
D. Imaging Technologies
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("Homeland
Security") found that airport screeners using magnetometers (metal
detection portals, discussed above) performed terribly when
attempting to identify weapons in carry-on baggage or hidden on
people's bodies.33 These poor field test results are Homeland
Security's justification for using "backscatter" x-rays.34
"Imaging technologies can see through clothes and produce an
image of the human body underneath."35 Active imaging analyzes
radiation which is scattered when the body is irradiated with x-rays.36
The process is simple. A person stands in front of a large box and a
very low power x-ray beam sweeps across the body.37 Using three-
dimensional imaging, a computer converts the data into a picture of
the person on a monitor.38 Objects that scatter or give off radiation in
a different manner than the human body will look distinctive in the
image.39 "Reflective" or backscatter x-rays can see objects that a
metal detector may miss, such as those made from ceramics and
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Lipton, supra note 28.
33. Joe Sharkey, On the Road: Airport Screeners Could Get X-Rated X-Ray Views, N.Y.
TIMES, May 24, 2005, at C5.
34. Id.
35. COMMITTEE ON COMMERCIAL AVIATION SECURITY ET AL., supra note 4, at 3.
36. Id.
37. Fred Reed, Scanner Virtually Disrobes Passenger, WASH. TIMES, May 22, 2003,
available at http://www.washtimes.com/business/20030521-094809-8963r.htm.
38. Id.
39. COMMITTEE ON COMMERCIAL AVIATION SECURITY ET AL., supra note 4, at 3.
Fall 2007]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol.41:385
plastics.4" These x-rays have been proven to be safe, penetrating a
mere 1/10th of an inch into the skin.4 In less than eight seconds, the
scan is complete, and no pat-down has to be performed.42
However, as helpful as this technology may be in detecting
illicit materials, it also produces a problem many see as equally
disturbing.43 "The pictures are of near-pornographic quality .... It
amounts to a black-and-white strip search."'  Appearing in the
image are not only concealed weapons, explosives, wallets, and coins
but also rolls of fat, the size of breasts and genitals, and catheter
tubes.45 Filters have been created to blur the genital area in response
to arguments that the images are too intrusive.46 "Cloaking" software
has also been developed which converts the images into "something
resembling a generic chalk outline of the body, identifying plastic,
ceramic, biological and other nonmetallic and metallic objects on the
body."47 Manufacturers of the backscatter machines recognize that
cloaking may reduce detection power, but this limitation may be a
trade-off that is required in order to balance security and privacy
issues.48
40. Airport Screening Technology: Full Exposure, supra note 27.
41. Reed, supra note 37. The amount of radiation from a backscatter x-ray amounts to less
than three mircrorem, which "is so low that a passenger would have to go through the screening
portal approximately 1,000 times to receive the same radiation dose as would be received from
cosmic ray exposure at high altitude during one transcontinental flight from New York to Los
Angeles." COMMITTEE ON COMMERCIAL AVIATION SECURITY ET AL., supra note 4, at 31. "A
person would have to be scanned with backscatter approximately 80,000 times merely to receive
the amount of radiation contained in one dental X-ray." Michael C. Murphy & Michael R. Wilds,
X-Rated X-Ray Invades Privacy Rights, 12 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 333, 338 (2001).
42. Reed, supra note 37.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.; AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, AIRPORT SECURITY: INCREASED SAFETY NEED NOT
COME AT THE EXPENSE OF CIVIL LIBERTIES (2002), http://www.aclu.org/safefree/resources/
16748res20020612.html.
46. Airport Screening Technology: Full Exposure, supra note 27.
47. Austin Considine, Will New Airport X-Rays Invade Privacy?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2005,
at 3.
48. Id. The two companies that manufacture the backscatter technology are Rapiscan
Systems, a division of OSI Systems, and American Science and Engineering. Id.
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III. EVOLUTION OF THE LAW
A. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause."49
The question, of course, is what do those words actually mean in
an airport? The following section will examine how the courts have
construed the Fourth Amendment with regard to airport passenger
screening. Next, a few detailed interpretations of the Fourth
Amendment's requirements such as the expectation of privacy and
reasonableness will be discussed. Finally, the special needs doctrine
will be introduced. This principle will be further analyzed in Part IV
where the Fourth Amendment will be applied to the two emerging
passenger screening technologies discussed in Part II.
B. Case Law
The courts first must determine whether something constitutes a
search. If there is no search, Fourth Amendment protections do not
apply. °
1. Expectation of Privacy
Katz v. United States is a landmark Fourth Amendment case."
While the case had no connection to airports, it is the starting point
for this article's analysis because of its discussion of privacy, search
and seizure, and governmental action. 2 The U.S. Supreme Court's
1967 opinion presents a threshold test for determining whether the
Fourth Amendment applies to a particular intrusion. 3
49. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
50. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-62 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (establishing a two-prong reasonableness test for determining whether a Fourth
Amendment search has occurred).
51. Id.
52. Id. The defendant was convicted of violating a statute prohibiting bets via wire. See id.
at 359. The Court had to determine whether the defendant's privacy had been violated when the
government listened to and recorded the defendant's telephone conversation in a public telephone
booth. Id. at 348. Holding that because the defendant had justifiably relied upon his privacy, the
government's actions amounted to an unconstitutional search and seizure. Id. at 353.
53. Id.
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Justice Stewart wrote for the majority and stated that the Fourth
Amendment does not extend to things a person knowingly and
publicly reveals. 4 On the other hand, the Fourth Amendment may
protect something a person tries to keep private, even in a public
area.5 Justice Harlan's concurrence expands upon what protection
the Fourth Amendment provides to people, stating: "there is a
twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation
be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'
56
Harlan's test has since been adopted by the Supreme Court as the
method of determining what constitutes a search, triggering
protection by the Fourth Amendment. 7
2. Administrative Searches and Consent
"[S]earch[es] of public or commercial premises carried out by a
regulatory authority for the purpose of enforcing compliance with
health, safety, or security regulations" are deemed administrative
searches. 8 Private searches are those "conducted by a private person
rather than by a law-enforcement officer. ' 59 The issue of consent and
how it relates to the general public's awareness of airport screening
procedures is a concept important to the analysis of whether
emerging technologies are reasonable searches and whether they will
be barred by the Fourth Amendment. The language of the Fourth
Amendment requires "probable cause" prior to a search.60 Probable
cause relates to the likelihood, not certainty, of the existence of
criminal activity.6 Administrative searches are an exception to the
54. Id. at 351.
55. Id. The Court stated that making a phone call from a glass telephone booth where he
could be seen did not cause the defendant to believe his words would also be heard. "To read the
Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play
in private communication." Id. at 352.
56. Id. at 361.
57. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) ("[A] Fourth Amendment search
occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes
as reasonable." (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)).
58. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1378 (8th ed. 2004).
59. Id.
60. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
61. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410,419(1969).
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Fourth Amendment's requirement for a warrant based on probable
cause, but they remain subject to the requirement of reasonableness.62
The 1973 Ninth Circuit decision in United States v. Davis
concerned a defendant who was convicted of trying to board an
airplane with a loaded gun in his briefcase.63 The Court held that
even if the search of the defendant's briefcase was conducted by a
private employee of the airline, the search was state action 64 for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment because the search was part of
the national anti-hijacking effort instituted in 1972.65 The Court
stated that evaluation of airport searches should be conducted using
standards related to "administrative" searches.66 Administrative
searches are not carried out to gather evidence as part of a criminal
investigation.67 Rather, administrative searches are performed "as
part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an
administrative purpose."68  The Court explained that airline
passenger screening is part of a general regulatory scheme, in
furtherance of the administrative purpose of preventing weapons or
explosives from being carried on to airplanes, in order to prevent
hijackings.6 9
To be valid, administrative searches must meet the standard of
reasonableness as required by the Fourth Amendment.7" To be
reasonable, a passenger "screening search must be as limited in its
intrusiveness as is consistent with satisfaction of the administrative
need that justifies it."'" Consequently, valid passenger screening
62. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908-10 (9th Cir. 1973).
63. Id. at 895.
64. State action is "fa]nything done by a government; esp., in constitutional law, an intrusion
on a person's rights (esp. civil rights) either by a governmental entity or by a private requirement
that can be enforced only by governmental action." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1444 (8th ed.
2004).
65. Davis, 482 F.2d at 903-04.
66. Id. at 908.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. The Court went on to explain that the essential purpose of the regulatory scheme is
to discourage people from carrying weapons or explosives on to airplanes, not to actually
discover those materials and arrest people carrying them. Id. Further, if passenger screening
devolves into general searches for evidence of crimes, courts will have to exclude any evidence
obtained from those searches. Id. at 909.
70. Id. at 910.
71. Id. "The scope of the search must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances
which rendered its initiation permissible." Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Terry
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searches at airports must acknowledge a person's right to decide not
to board an airplane and therefore not be subject to the search.72 The
Court utilized the issue of consent as the measurement of whether the
search was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.1 3 A person has the
choice, as a matter of constitutional law, to submit to a search of her
person and carry-on baggage, as a condition to boarding an airplane,
or to leave. 4 The passenger's choice can be seen as either a decision
to give up the right to leave or a decision to submit to the search."
Either way, the choice is seen as "a 'consent,' granting the
government a license to do what it would otherwise be barred from
doing by the Fourth Amendment." 6  This consent must be
voluntary.77 The Court suggested that airports make the options
available to passengers approaching screening areas so obvious that
someone who decides to board an airplane has consented to the
screening." However, at the time the incident at issue occurred, in
1971, "[t]he nature and scope of airport searches were not then
widely known. '79 Therefore, without clear notice of the choice to be
screened or not board the airplane, attempting to board the airplane
was not necessarily consent.80
Passenger consent to airport screening searches and the general
population's awareness of the forms of screening procedures
employed at airports are critical components of the analysis of
whether the Fourth Amendment will permit or prevent the use of
emerging screening technologies. Both consent and awareness are
frisks, as they have come to be known, allow police to pat down a person who has been
legitimately stopped if the police have reason to believe the person is armed and dangerous.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The justification for this frisk is that the police are allowed to
protect themselves while questioning a person about possible criminal activity. Id. Terry frisks
are therefore not extended to encompass airport screening searches because that "would result in
intrusions upon privacy unwarranted by the need." Davis, 482 F.2d at 907. "There is no reason
to believe that the incidence of concealed weapons is greater among airline passengers than
among members of the public generally, and Terry does not justify the wholesale 'frisking' of the
general public in order to locate weapons and prevent future crimes." Id. at 907-08.
72. Davis, 482 F.2d at 910-Il.
73. Id. at913.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 913-14 (discussing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
78. Id. at 914.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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aspects of reasonableness. The more the public knows about newer
technologies and the more the public accepts their use, the greater the
likelihood the technologies will be deemed reasonable searches
under the Fourth Amendment.
3. Danger Satisfies Reasonableness Test
As demonstrated throughout this article, determining
reasonableness is the crux of the Fourth Amendment search issue. In
1973, the Fifth Circuit decided that some situations present a level of
danger such that the reasonableness test is per se satisfied.8'
Lee Skipwith III was convicted of cocaine possession after an
airport screening search revealed drugs, but not weapons.82 In United
States v. Skipwith, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Middle District of
Florida, holding that the search was constitutional.83 The Court
found that a balance must be struck between the harm and the need
to determine what is reasonable. 4 "When the risk is the jeopardy to
hundreds of human lives and millions of dollars of property inherent
in the pirating or blowing up of a large airplane, the danger alone
meets the test of reasonableness." 85
The Skipwith Court expanded on United States v. Moreno86 by
holding that "those who actually present themselves for boarding on
an air carrier, like those seeking entrance into the country, are subject
to a search based on mere or unsupported suspicion."87 The Court
analogized the difference between the main airport and the boarding
gate to the difference between the borders of the country and the
interior of the country.88
The defendant also unsuccessfully argued that the search he was
subjected to was too broad in scope: that the search was
81. United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973).
82. Id.
83. Id. The drugs were also held to be properly admitted into evidence at trial. Id. This line
of inquiry is outside the scope of this article.
84. Id. at 1276.
85. Id. The Court further explained that the search must have a reasonable scope, must be
conducted in good faith in order to prevent hijacking, and the passenger must have received
advance notice of the search in such a manner that he could avoid the search by opting not to fly.
Id.
86. 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that reasonableness should be determined on a
case-by-case basis for searches of people in the general airport area).
87. Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1276.
88. Id. at 1276-77.
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constitutionally limited to a frisk for weapons and he should not have
been required to empty his pockets.89 Noting that "[t]he range and
variety of devices real and simulated which can be used to intimidate
the crew of an aircraft when it is aloft are almost limitless[,]" the
Court found that the officer "was justified in undertaking a search
with sufficient scope to reveal any object or instrumentality that
Skipwith could reasonably have used to effect an act of air piracy."9 °
The amount of danger posed to the public by a person who seeks
to blow up an airplane, coupled with the concept of airport boarding
gates as analogous to our nation's borders, has created a situation in
the United States where courts may view passenger airport screening
searches as virtually per se reasonable. The important issue for
emerging screening technologies is whether factors unique to those
technologies make the reasonableness of their use less certain.
4. Magnetometers are Administrative Searches
A section of the Gibson v. State9 decision addressed whether the
defendant was subjected to unlawful restraint by being required to
pass through a metal detector before entering a courthouse.92 This
part of the opinion traces the evolution of case law related to the
Fourth Amendment, administrative searches, and airport searches.93
Gibson was a Texas attorney who petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus alleging that his liberty was restrained by the Sheriff of El
Paso County, who had required that Gibson walk through a metal
detector and pass his belongings through an x-ray machine, similar to
the requirements in airports, before being allowed to enter the
courthouse.94 The Court restated the long-standing finding that "[t]he
use of a magnetometer is a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment."95  The Court explained that only unreasonable
89. Id. at 1277. The officer asked Skipwith to empty his pockets once he noticed a three
inch by two inch bulge in his pants pocket, after discovering he was traveling under a false name,
and after noticing that the defendant was very nervous and appeared to be under the influence of
drugs or alcohol. Id. at 1273-74. The officer later testified that he believed the bulge was a gun,
although it turned out to be a plastic bag containing cocaine. Id. at 1274.
90. Id. at 1277. The court went on to find that the three inch by two inch pocket bulge
clearly fell within the limit of such a search. Id.
91. 921 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. App. 1996).
92. Id. at 756.
93. Id. at 756-59.
94. Id. at 751-52.
95. Id. at 757 (citing United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir. 1972)).
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searches and seizures are forbidden by the Constitution and that
"[w]arrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless the search
falls within one of 'a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions. "'9 6
The courthouse magnetometer search was a warrantless search,
the reasonableness of which must be determined by weighing the
governmental interest against the invasion of privacy caused by the
search.97 As the Court analyzed the reasonableness of the situation at
hand, it evaluated prior decisions that related to magnetometer
searches at airports.98 The Court determined that the proper standard
to be used to assess magnetometer searches is that of the
administrative search because at its heart, an administrative search is
not conducted to gather evidence as part of a criminal investigation,
but rather is performed as part of a general regulatory scheme in
furtherance of an administrative purpose.
99
5. Avoiding Airport Screening Searches by Electing Not to Fly
The main airport area has been distinguished from the boarding
gate area. ' Airport screening searches are not conducted until a
person wishes to move into the boarding gate area. Since September
11, 2001, only ticketed passengers are allowed to pass through to the
boarding gates."0 The question of specifically when a person can
change her mind about whether to be screened and to fly was
addressed in Torbet v. United Airlines, Inc.'
0 2
At a Los Angeles International Airport security checkpoint,
Hugo Torbet walked through the metal detector and sent his carry-on
bag through the x-ray scanner.'0 3 Torbet's bag was selected for a
96. Gibson, 921 S.W.2d at 757 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
97. Id. "The search must be 'justified at its inception' and 'reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."' Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
98. Id. at 757-59.
99. Id. at 757-58. See supra Part III.B.2.
100. See supra Part IlI.B.3.
101. Each airline may make exceptions for minors traveling alone, the elderly, or those with
physical challenges. FlyDenver.com, Frequently Asked Questions About Security Procedures,
http://www.flydenver.com/guide/tips/security.asp (last visited Oct. 7, 2007).
102. 298 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2002). But see United States v. Aukai, No. 04-10226, 2007 WL
2283585, at *5 (9th Cir. Aug. 10, 2007); infra note 1 11.
103. Id. at 1088.
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random search, but he refused to consent or agree."° Torbet declared
that he wished to leave the airport rather than consent to the search
but was told by a police officer (who had been called for by security
personnel) that he could not leave until his bag was searched." 5
Nothing of significance was found in the search, and Torbet
continued on to his flight.
10 6
Torbet later sued on a number of grounds, challenging "the
policy that bags be subject to random search without reasonable
suspicion that the bags contain weapons or explosives."107 The
District Court found for the defendants.' Torbet appealed on only
one of his claims, arguing "that random post-x-ray searches are
facially invalid, in the absence of express consent, unless the x-ray
scan arouses suspicion."10 9
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating that under Davis, '
screening procedures at airports must be reasonable to comply with
the Fourth Amendment...' "An airport screening search is reasonable
if: (1) it is no more extensive or intensive than necessary, in light of
current technology, to detect weapons or explosives; (2) it is
confined in good faith to that purpose; and (3) passengers may avoid
the search by electing not to fly.,," 2 The passenger's choice not to
fly must occur before she puts luggage on the x-ray conveyor. 3 The
Court then held that by putting his bag on the x-ray conveyor belt,
Torbet impliedly consented to the random search." 4
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1089.
109. Id.
110. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973). But see United States v. Aukai, No.
04-10226, 2007 WL 2283585, at *5 (9th Cir. Aug. 10, 2007); infra note 111.
111. Torbet, 298 F.3d at 1089 (discussing Davis, 482 F.2d at 904, 910).
112. Id. (citing Davis, 482 F.2d at 913).
113. Id. (citing United States v. Pulido-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d 899, 901-02 (9th Cir. 1986)).
114. Id. "'[P]assengers placing luggage on an x-ray machine's conveyor belt for airplane
travel at a secured boarding area impliedly consent to a visual inspection and limited hand search
of their luggage if the x-ray scan is inconclusive in determining whether the luggage contains
weapons or other dangerous objects."' Id. (quoting Pulido-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d at 901). On
August 10, 2007, the Ninth Circuit clarified its position on consent and essentially overruled the
holdings of Davis and Torbet in United States v. Aukai, No. 04-10226, 2007 WL 2283585, at *5
(9th Cir. Aug. 10, 2007). The court stated that "[t]he constitutionality of an airport screening
search ... does not depend on consent... and requiring that a potential passenger be allowed to
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6. Warrantless, Suspicionless Searches
Christian Hartwell was arrested for possession of crack cocaine
after setting off a metal detector at a security checkpoint in the
Philadelphia International Airport."' A hand-held wand
magnetometer was subsequently used to determine what had caused
the portal detector alarm." 6  The parties dispute what transpired
next," 7 but based on the uncontested facts, both the District Court
and Third Circuit held that the search was justified."8
The Third Circuit held that the administrative search doctrine
permitted the search and did not evaluate the lower court's alternate
theories. 1"' While a search in the absence of suspicion or
revoke consent to an ongoing airport security search makes little sense in a post-9/l 1 world." Id.
The court further explained that the use of either a theory of ongoing consent, as in Davis, or a
theory of irrevocable implied consent, as in Torbet, does not make sense when consent is not
required for the administrative search in the first place. Id. "[AII that is required is the
passenger's election to attempt entry into the secured area of an airport. Under current TSA
regulations and procedures, that election occurs when a prospective passenger walks through the
magnetometer or places items on the conveyor belt of the x-ray machine." Id.
115. United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 175 (3rd Cir. 2006).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 176. The defendant claimed he was taken to a private screening room by a
Transportation Security Administration agent. Id. at 176. The agent repeatedly requested that
Hartwell take out what was in his pockets. Id. After multiple refusals, the agent reached into the
defendant's pocket, pulled out a package of drugs, and called the Philadelphia police. Id. The
police then searched the defendant, found two more packages of drugs, and arrested him. Id.
In contrast, the government claimed that neither the TSA agent nor the police reached into the
defendant's pocket without consent. Id. The agent said that Hartwell requested a private
screening and then refused to reveal the contents of his pocket. He then "nervously backed away"
from the agent and "suddenly dropped his pants." Id. This behavior caused the agent to call for
backup. Id. When a police officer arrived, the defendant handed over a package of drugs when
prompted to do so. Id. Hartwell then pretended to fall on the floor and dropped another drug
package. Id.
Neither the defendant nor the government disputed that the defendant set off the metal detector.
Id. at 175. Hartwell did not contest that he was told to remove all metal objects from his body
prior to screening or that he was asked multiple times to remove objects from a specific pocket.
Id. The District Court found the officers' actions were justified on these facts, regardless of
which version of the story was true. Id. at 176.
118. Id. at 175-76. The District Court held the search was permissible under three theories:
1) the search was not unreasonable, and therefore was constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment; 2) the search "was a 'consensual administrative search';" and 3) the defendant gave
his implied consent to the search when he submitted to the screening process; thus, once the
alarm sounded, the defendant was required by law to finish the search to determine what had
triggered the alarm. Id. at 176 (quoting United States v. Hartwell, 296 F.Supp.2d 596, 602 (E.D.
Pa. 2003)).
119. See id. at 177-78. In this opinion, published on the day he received his commission to
be Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Judge Alito noted that airport security screenings
prior to boarding a plane are searches. One controversy in this case concerned whether the
defendant was subject to multiple searches or one extended search. While there is case law on
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wrongdoing is normally unreasonable, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged a few circumstances in which this rule is
inapplicable.12  "These circumstances typically involve
administrative searches of 'closely regulated' businesses, other so-
called 'special needs' cases, and suspicionless 'checkpoint'
searches."'' The Court stated that suspicionless searches at
checkpoints "are permissible under the Fourth Amendment when a
court finds a favorable balance between 'the gravity of the public
concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure
advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with
individual liberty. '"'122
The Court then found that the airport checkpoint in this case
passed this balancing test.'23  First, the Court emphasized the
importance of preventing terrorist attacks against airplanes.'24 Next,
the Court found that the public interest is advanced by security
checkpoints at airports because without searches, there is no reliable
way to determine which passengers may hijack a plane.'25 Finally,
the Court stated that this case involved minimally intrusive search
procedures.'26
Hartwell is significant for several reasons. First, it is quite
recent, having been decided on January 31, 2006.127 Second, the
opinion takes a definitive position on an aspect of screenings that
courts have been divided on by stating that the described search was
valid under administrative search doctrine. 2' Third, the Court
addressed administrative searches at length and established a test to
determine whether such warrantless, suspicionless searches are
both sides of this argument, the Court here followed Skipwith and similar cases, which "analyze
an entire checkpoint search, including '[m]etal detectors, visual inspection, and rare but potential
physical searches,' as a single search." Id. (quoting United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272,
1275-76 (5th Cir. 1973)).
120. See Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 178.
121. Id. The special needs doctrine is addressed infra Part III.C.
122. Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 178-79 (citing Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427 (2004)).
123. Id. at 179.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 179-80.
126. Id. at 180. The Court found that the procedures used "were well-tailored to protect
personal privacy, escalating in invasiveness only after a lower level of screening disclosed a
reason to conduct a more probing search." Id.
127. Id. at 174.
128. Id. at 177.
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constitutional.'29 This test will be an important tool for evaluating
new security screening technologies. Finally, the opinion was
written by then Circuit Judge-but now Supreme Court Justice-
Alito,"'° and his position may give us a glimpse into the future about
how the Supreme Court may interpret the Fourth Amendment as it
relates to new technologies in airport passenger screening.
C. The Special Needs Doctrine
The "special needs" doctrine is an exception to the general rule
that warrantless and suspicionless searches are presumed to be
unreasonable.3  This doctrine allows government officials to
conduct searches in the absence of any suspicion of criminality in
limited circumstances where the purpose of the search is not to
gather evidence for the investigation of crime.'32
This doctrine originated in Justice Blackmun's 1985 concurring
opinion in New Jersey v. T.L.O."' Blackmun agreed with the
majority's balancing test; however, he noted that "[o]nly in those
exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause
requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its
balancing of interests for that of the Framers."'34 The special needs
doctrine was embraced in later cases by a majority of the Court as
the standard for evaluating whether suspicionless searches are
valid. "'
Recently, the Second Circuit evaluated checkpoint searches at
New York City subway stations.'36 Because the search program was
aimed only at detecting explosives and people were free to refuse to
be searched if they left the subway, the Court held that protecting the
subway from terrorist attack was a special need aside from general
129. Id. at 177-81.
130. Id. at 174.
131. Fourth Amendment 'Special Needs' Doctrine Justifies Suspicionless Subway
Checkpoints, 75 U.S. L. WK. 1115, 1115 (2006) [hereinafter Special Needs].
132. Tracy Maclin, Is Obtaining an Arrestee s DNA a Valid Special Needs Search Under the
Fourth Amendment? What Should (and Will) the Supreme Court Do?, 33:1 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
102, 107 (2005); see also Special Needs, supra note 13 1, at 1115.
133. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
134. Id. at 351.
135. Maclin, supra note 132 at 109.
136. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2nd Cir. 2006).
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law enforcement.'37 This is the threshold showing the special needs
doctrine requires. 38  The plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that
defending the subway against terrorists only constitutes a special
need if an attack is imminent.'39 The Second Circuit concluded that
an emergency did not have to exist in order to qualify a crime
prevention search as a special need. 4'
The doctrine next requires a court to analyze the validity of a
suspicionless search by weighing opposing factors against each
other. Such factors include whether the government interest for the
search program is immediate and substantial, whether the person
being searched has an actual and reasonable expectation of privacy
surrounding the item being searched, whether the search is minimally
intrusive, and whether the search program effectively advances the
government interest.' Taking these factors in turn, the Court first
stated that significant weight can be assigned to the government's
interest in preventing great harm to the public, whether or not an
express threat exists.'42 In fact, "[a]ll that is required is that the 'risk
to public safety [be] substantial and real' instead of merely
'symbolic."" 43 Next, the Court decided that subway passengers have
an expectation of privacy with regards to objects they carry in closed,
opaque bags.' However, the subway checkpoint search minimally
intruded upon the passengers' privacy expectation.'45 Finally, the
Court stated that it was not their place to perform an in depth
137. Id. at 270-71. "Accordingly, preventing a terrorist from bombing the subways
constitutes a special need that is distinct from ordinary post hoc criminal investigation." Id. at
271. The court then noted that the Hartwell decision rejected a "Fourth Amendment challenge to
airport checkpoints and recogniz[ed] the need to 'preventfJ terrorist attacks on airplanes. "' Id.
(citing United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 179 (3rd Cir. 2006)).
138. Special Needs, supra note 131, at 1115.
139. MacWade, 460 F.3d at 271. The plaintiffs based their argument on a comment made by
the U.S. Supreme Court in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond: "Of course, there are circumstances
that may justify a law enforcement checkpoint where the primary purpose would otherwise, but
for some emergency, relate to ordinary crime control." Special Needs, supra note 131, at 1115
(quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
140. Special Needs, supra note 131, at 1115; see also MacWade, 460 F.3d at 271.
141. Special Needs, supra note 131, at 1115-16; see also MacWade, 460 F.3d at 270-71
(explaining that the second facet of the special needs doctrine is to determine the reasonableness
of a search by balancing several factors).
142. MacWade, 460 F.3d at 272.
143. Id. (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322-23 (1997)).
144. Id. at 272-73.
145. Id. at 272.
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analysis of the efficacy of the checkpoint search program.'46 Rather,
the Court found that the program was an effective deterrent, in part
because "expert testimony established that terrorists seek predictable
and vulnerable targets, and the [New York Police Department's
subway] Program generates uncertainty that frustrates that goal,
which, in turn, deters an attack."' 4 7 The Court therefore held that the
subway checkpoint search program was reasonable and
constitutional under the special needs doctrine.'48
IV. APPLICATION OF THE LAW
Tracing the evolution of the law as it applies to airport
screenings reveals a number of disturbing points about our Fourth
Amendment protections. A review of the cases related to airport
searches illustrates that the private person rarely wins and that
searches are almost always found to be reasonable.'49 Further,
avoiding screening by electing not to fly does not amount to a real
choice on the part of the passenger.
Searches must be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, but
reasonableness for airport searches is judged by weighing the
individual's right to be free from intrusion against the general
public's interest in traveling safely by air. 5° As declared in Torbet,
the test for determining whether an airport screening search is
reasonable, which stems from Davis, consists of three elements: "(1)
it is no more extensive or intensive than necessary, in light of current
technology, to detect weapons or explosives; (2) it is confined in
good faith to that purpose; and (3) passengers may avoid the search
by electing not to fly."'"'
146. Id.
147. Id. at 274.
148. Id. at 275.
149. See supra Part III.
150. United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 616 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v.
Pulido-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d 899, 901 (9th Cir. 1986)).
151. See Torbet v. United Airlines, Inc., 298 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing United
States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 913 (9th Cir. 1973)). But see United States v. Aukai, No. 04-
10226, 2007 WL 2283585, at *5 (9th Cir. Aug. 10, 2007); supra note 114.
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A. Magnetometers (Metal Detectors)
The law is clear that metal detectors, or magnetometers, are
reasonable searches at airports.152 A person walking through a metal
detection portal is subject to a minimal invasion of privacy, and the
portal "does not annoy, frighten or humiliate those who pass through
it."' 53  In perhaps the clearest statement of why metal detector
searches are reasonable, the Fourth Circuit stated, "[T]he use of a
magnetometer to detect metal ... is not a resented intrusion on
privacy, but, instead, a welcome reassurance of safety. Such a search
is more than reasonable; it is a compelling necessity to protect
essential air commerce and the lives of passengers." '154
When magnetometers were first introduced as a regular part of
airport screening in the early 1970's, most people laughed at the
thought of security personnel going through their bags and
determining what they were carrying on their bodies.'55 But as
history reveals, we adjusted to metal detector screenings prior to
boarding planes, and now society regards them as normal.'56 In fact,
now people may even be hesitant to get on a plane if there was no
security screening prior to boarding. Acceptance of this type of
warrantless and suspicionless search has trickled into other parts of
society as well. 5 7 There are metal detectors at courthouses, schools,
and stadiums.'58 While some may find magnetometers at these types
152. See Gibson v. State, 921 S.W.2d 747, 757-58, 763 (Tex. App. 1996) (finding that metal
detector searches at the El Paso County Courthouse were reasonable).
153. United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806 (2nd Cir. 1974).
154. United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 772 (4th Cir. 1972).
155. WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT §
10.6 (3d ed. 1996).
156. Paul Glastris .... One That Should Be The Best, But Isn 't, WASHINGTON MONTHLY,
Mar. 1998, at 27.
157. For example, in 1994, the Kentucky Attorney General released an opinion regarding
metal detector searches in schools. Stating that the administrative search doctrine had been used
to find metal detector searches in airports constitutional, the opinion found that the doctrine also
supported the use of metal detectors in schools due to the increased number of weapons being
brought into schools. The Attorney General further noted that the administrative search doctrine
had also been used to uphold the use of metal detectors in courthouses. Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. 94-58
(1994).
158. "It is, for example, common practice to require every prospective airline passenger, or
every visitor to a public building, to pass through a metal detector that will reveal the presence of
a firearm or an explosive." Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 473 (1990)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). "The metal detectors has [sic] their advent at the airports. Their use has
spread to prisons and courts. At the time of submitting this petition, their use has spread to some
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of locations annoying, society in general has allowed their use
without an uproar that Fourth Amendment rights are being
violated."'
It is a slippery slope to be mindful of, particularly in light of the
much more intrusive search technologies that are emerging for use in
airports. We risk eroding our Fourth Amendment rights to the point
of being meaningless if we allow our adjustment to technology in
airports to become an automatic approval for using that technology
in other contexts.'60 The White House Commission on Aviation
Safety and Security was reminded of this consequence in 1996: "[B]e
mindful that the security system adopted for airports today will likely
be imposed in other arenas tomorrow. Just as magnetometers and X-
ray machines have found their ways into government buildings,
banks and schools, so may the enhanced security measures the
Commission may recommend."'' These other contexts do not share
many of the characteristics of airports that made the searches
"reasonable" in the first place. For example, courthouses and
stadiums are not analogous to national borders. One cannot elect to
not attend school if one does not wish to consent to a search.'62 We
need to be wary of new technologies used for airport searches
reaching into other parts of society without our first performing a
thorough examination of what rights would be eroded by their
allowance.'63
urban schools." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 36-37, Lamson v. United States, 510 U.S. 1013
(1993), cert. denied, (No. 93-663).
159. In fact, cases regarding metal detectors are virtually non-existent at the Supreme Court
level. "This Court has never dealt with a case involving the legality of stationary metal detector
searches at federal building that house courts such as those in which defendant practices. Indeed,
the Court has never taken certiorari in cases involving challenges to metal detector searches at
airports." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 36-37, Lamson, 510 U.S. 1013 (No. 93-663).
160. "The process of intrusion into one's daily life is rapidly becoming routine as society
becomes desensitized to the creeping encroachment on individual privacy. Increasing intrusions
on privacy at venues other than border checkpoints or airports naturally follow .... Hence, the
slippery slope of eroding privacy begins." Murphy & Wilds, supra note 41, at 340.
161. Civil Liberties Implications of Airport Security Measures: Hearing Before White H.
Comm. in Aviation Safety and Security, (1996) (statement of Gregory T. Nojeim, Legis. Counsel,
American Civil Liberties Union), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/faa/aclu-testimony
.html.
162. Massachusetts passed the first compulsory school attendance law in 1852. Every state in
the nation had a similar law by 1918. Samuel L. Blumenfeld, Are Compulsory School Attendance
Laws Necessary? Part 1, THE BLUMENFELD EDUCATION LETTER, Sept. 1990, at 1, 5.
163. See generally Dukes, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 853 (comparing administrative searches using
metal detectors in schools to those in airports and courthouses). Dukes was the first case that
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B. Trace Detection Technologies
The "puffer" machines being utilized at more and more airports
intrude minimally on the privacy of passengers, similar to metal
detectors. Therefore, the analysis of whether puffers satisfy the
reasonableness test is virtually identical to that for magnetometers.'64
The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") favors machines
such as puffers because they "preserve the privacy and dignity of
passengers far more than pat-downs, physical searches, and
backscatter x-rays. ' ' 16' However, false positives are a continuing
concern with this technology. 6  Items such as heart medicines may
be so similar chemically to an explosive that the alarm is triggered.
67
The ACLU suggests that Congress oversee the implementation of
puffers to make certain that there is not an unacceptably high
percentage of false positives and that people who prompt false
positives are treated fairly.'68
It should be noted that trace detection machines that can identify
chemical signatures could be used to recognize illegal drugs. 169 Use
in this capacity would constitute an illegal search "because airport
searches are authorized only to identify objects or materials that are a
threat to the safety of the airplane." 7 ' Since illegal drugs do not in
and of themselves threaten airplane safety, airport security is not
allowed to search specifically for drugs.7 '
While no court has yet been faced with deciding the
constitutionality of trace detection portals, the analogy to metal
detectors and the reasonableness of their use at airports seems
litigated the issue of metal detectors in schools. Charles J. Russo & Jacqueline A. Stefkovich,
Search and Seizure in the Schools, NASSP BULL. (Nat'l Assn. of Secondary Sch. Principals),
Sept. 1998, at 31.
164. See supra Part IV.A.
165. Principles for Evaluating Physical Screening Techniques and Technologies Consistent
with Constitutional Norms: Hearing on the U.S. Transportation Security Administration's
Physical Screening of Airline Passengers and Related Cargo and Airport Screening Before the
U.S. S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of
Timothy D. Sparapani, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union), available at
http://www.aclu.org/privacy/gen/24856leg2OO6O4O4.html.
166. See supra Part II.C.
167. See supra Part II.C.
168. See supra Part II.C.
169. COMMITTEE ON COMMERCIAL AVIATION SECURITY ET AL., supra note 4, at 42.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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certainly predictable. Because the intrusion on personal privacy is
negligible, there is little concern that the use of this emerging
technology in passenger screening will erode our Fourth Amendment
rights. In the absence of an invasion of bodily privacy, there seems
to be little basis to declare puffers to be unreasonable searches.
C. Imaging Technologies
Backscatter x-rays are certainly considered searches under the
Katz test.' People have an expectation of privacy for what is under
their clothes.'73 Whether backscatter x-rays are reasonable searches
under the Fourth Amendment is far from clear. What is clear is that
many groups oppose the use of this technology. Privacy
International awarded the Federal Aviation Administration the "Most
Invasive Proposal" Award for the BodyScan scanners being placed
in airports for use by customs. 74 Privacy International presents its
"Big Brother Awards" annually in the United States (as well a
number of other countries) to organizations that invade personal
privacy the most.'75
Although ten years ago imaging technologies such as
backscatter x-rays were just beginning to be developed, privacy
concerns were already contemplated.'76 As with trace detection of
illegal drugs, imaging technology presents the ability to discover
illegal items on a passenger's body that are not threatening and
therefore are not within the scope of the constitutional search.'77 The
Panel on Passenger Screening stated, "Fourth Amendment challenges
based on illegal search or on an improperly carried out search must
be expected when these technologies are implemented in airports."'7
Another issue the Panel predicted in 1996 related to archiving the
172. See supra Part III.B.I.
173. Addie S. Ries, Comment, America's Anti-Hyacking Campaign-Will It Conform to Our
Constitution?, 3 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 123, 134 (2001).
174. The award statue is called the "Orwell" and depicts a boot stomping on a head. See The
2000 U.S. Big Brother Awards, Privacy Int'l, Apr. 5, 2000, http://www.privacyintemational.org/
bigbrother/us2000/.
175. Id.
176. See COMMITTEE ON COMMERCIAL AVIATION SECURITY ET AL., supra note 4, at 14-16,
44.
177. ld. at41.
178. Id.
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images.'79 They noted that the ability to store images of passengers
until flights arrived safely at their destinations could generate
invasion of privacy lawsuits. 80 The Panel stressed that protocols
related to the use and disposal of the images of passengers' bodies
must be developed to safeguard this highly sensitive and personal
data. "81
Those who support the use of backscatter x-rays point out that
courts have allowed passenger searches via metal detectors under the
administrative search doctrine and the public has grown accustomed
to submitting to searches in many places in addition to airports.'
Therefore, the issue with backscatter x-rays (and other emerging
technologies) is how they differ from metal detectors.'83 One
argument is that an increased need for security in our airports could
create a justification for the courts to allow suspicionless searches no
matter what level of privacy intrusion is created.'84 A second
argument is that the backscatter x-ray would be used as an alternative
to hand or strip-searches, both of which are more intrusive than the
backscatter.'85 Finally, backscatter x-rays detect plastic explosives
and weapons components that metal detectors miss.'86
A middle ground view of imaging technologies goes directly to
the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.'87 The
question then is whether the search was reasonable under the
circumstances.'88  How is this decided? "The greater the level of
suspicion, the more intrusive the search may be. . .. [I]ntrusion is
keyed to embarrassment, indignity, and invasion of privacy."'89
On the other side, opponents of backscatter x-rays for passenger
screening loudly protest the invasion of privacy caused by this
technology. Backscatter x-rays utilized as a primary screening tool
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Murphy & Wilds, supra note 41, at 336-37.
183. See id. at 334.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 337-38.
186. Id. at 337.
187. Steven Vina, Comment, Virtual Strip Searches at Airports: Are Border Searches Seeing
Through the Fourth Amendment?, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 417, 424 (2002).
188. Id.
189. United States v. Mejia, 720 F.2d 1378, 1382 (5th Cir. 1983).
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would likely have a more difficult time satisfying the reasonableness
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. While magnetometers do not
have the ability to detect explosives or biological weapons, trace
detection portals would clearly be a less intrusive search than
backscatter x-rays for that purpose. Opponents argue that "[b]ody-
scanning is a debasing and humiliating procedure, and its routine use
fails basic balancing tests .... This technology should be used as a
last resort."' °  Manufacturers of the technology say that using
backscatter as a tool secondary to metal detectors defeats its
advantages. 9' They maintain that some of the passengers who do not
set off a metal detector are exactly the people who should be
screened with backscatter."' However, a potential problem of
backscatter x-rays if used as primary screening devices is that legal
items might be mistaken for illegal ones, prompting a further
search.'93
The ACLU is against the use of backscatter x-rays for primary
passenger screening.' a It contends that "[p]assengers expect privacy
underneath their clothing and should not be required to display
highly personal details of their bodies such as evidence of
mastectomies, colostomy appliances, penile implants, catheter tubes,
and the size of their breasts or genitals as a pre-requisite to boarding
a plane."'95 Further, security searches have been the cover for the
sexual assault of many women.'96 Given the amount of detail the
backscatter images reveal, "[a]buse of this powerful technology is
not a hypothetical. . . .Given recent experiences, it is inevitable.
190. Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Calls for Removal of Controversial
See-Through Scanner in Orlando (Mar. 15, 2002), http://www.aclu.org/privacy/gen/
14808prs20020315.html. The press release goes on to argue that explosives detection equipment
may provide the same amount of security as backscatter x-rays, but without an invasion of bodily
privacy. Id.
191. Considine, supra note 47.
192. Id.
193. "Even the presence of an innocuously shaped item, such as a seemingly prosthetic device
or implant, will require subsequent (and potentially humiliating) verification. Thus, X-ray
backscatter requires a tremendous invasion of privacy with little speed or efficacy gains."
Hearings, supra note 165 (testimony of Timothy D. Sparapani).
194. ACLU, Airport Security: Increased Safety Need Not Come at the Expense of Civil
Liberties (2002), http://www.aclu.org/safefree/resources/16748res200206I2.html [hereinafter
Airport Security].
195. Id.
196. Airport Security, supra note 194.
Fall 2007]
410 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:385
Airport security personnel do not check their sexual impulses at the
door when they arrive for work."' 97
Despite all of the legitimate privacy concerns this technology
presents, it is likely to be accepted, just as metal detector searches
have been. But the acceptance should be limited to use as a
secondary screening tool, as that is the only reasonable application
for a technology that is so invasive. Under Skipwith, mere suspicion
is all that is required to perform an airport passenger search.'9 8 The
Skipwith court permitted the scope of a search to be as broad as
necessary to confirm the passenger had no weapons, while also
mandating that the imposition on the passenger could be no greater
than necessary. '99 Searches such as pat-downs and strip-searches
have already been found to be reasonable for preventing passengers
from carrying weapons onto airplanes."' It is therefore likely that
backscatter x-rays will be allowed as an alternative secondary search
form since they are comparably invasive, if not actually less so than
pat-downs and strip-searches.2"' The Hartwell court stated that a
more highly invasive search that is narrowly tailored to protect
privacy and utilized only after a regular screening is permitted under
the administrative search doctrine.0 2 This rule would support the use
of backscatter x-rays as secondary screening tools and conceivably
prevent their use for primary screening. The ACLU, one of the most
vocal opponents of the use of backscatter x-ray for primary
screening, supports its use as an alternative to body cavity searches,
which have been legally triggered by other primary screening
means.
20 3
The use of backscatter x-rays for primary passenger screening in
the future should be resisted. As many voices as possible should
rally to defend the right to privacy and declare that this type of
search is and will remain unreasonable to Americans, despite
increasing terror fears.
197. Id.
198. United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973); see supra Part 111.B.3.
199. Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1276-77.
200. Ries, supra note 173, at 197.
201. Id.
202. United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 180 (3rd Cir. 2006).
203. "[S]uch technology may be used in place of an intrusive search, such as a body cavity
search, when there is probable cause sufficient to support such a search. Airport Security, supra
note 194.
AIRPORT PASSENGER SCREENING
V. PROPOSAL
In today's climate of terror and ever-evolving types of threats, it
is probably not possible to draw a distinct line between what is a
reasonable or unreasonable airline passenger search under the Fourth
Amendment. The most important principle to cling to is to require
that searches invade passengers' privacy as minimally as possible.
Indeed, "[t]he level of intrusion-the degree to which a proposed
measure invades privacy-should reflect the level of risk, and, if
both are effective, the least intrusive physical screening technology
or technique should always trump the more invasive technology. 2 4
The administrative search exception to the Fourth Amendment
makes this necessary.20 5 This is similar to applying a strict scrutiny
analysis to a law that allegedly infringes upon a fundamental right.
The government must show a compelling actual purpose for the law,
the means must be narrowly tailored to the objective, and there can
be no less restrictive ways to achieve the objective. Strict scrutiny
should be applied to the utilization of emerging airport technologies
that have the possibility of infringing on the right to privacy. Using
the least personally invasive means of screening airline passengers is
how to be certain that there is no method less restrictive of the right
to privacy.
One method of making backscatter x-ray searches less intrusive
on privacy2°6 is to have an agent off-site view the images in real time.
The embarrassment factor would be greatly reduced if passengers
knew that the person viewing the detailed images of their bodies
were in a remote location. Only when the backscatter revealed a
potentially prohibited item would an on-site agent be notified. By
separating the image from the actual person, the general public
would be relieved from some of the humiliation and indignity that
backscatter x-rays could cause.
Of course, knowing that the person looking at an image of their
virtually naked body is somewhere else may be of little consolation
to many passengers. And people may feel violated simply because
they feel they have done nothing to deserve this level of scrutiny.
Even this possible method of lessening the impact of the privacy
204. Hearings, supra note 165 (testimony of Timothy D. Sparapani).
205. See supra Part III.B.2.
206. In addition to the cloaking technology, discussed supra in Part II.D.
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invasion by the backscatter x-ray leaves the technology with too
much power at the initial stage of passenger screening. Backscatter
x-rays should be deemed unreasonable searches under the Fourth
Amendment if used for primary screening. Only when utilized as a
substitute for other methods currently used in secondary screening,
such as pat-downs and cavity searches, should the backscatter x-ray
be adjudged reasonable.
VI. CONCLUSION
Even in this post-September-lI era of heightened security
needs, we must be cautious not to let fear and a desire for protection
override our privacy concerns and warp the definition of
"reasonable." There is no going back once rights have been eroded.
Society will become accustomed to the gradual deterioration of
rights and one day wake to find that privacy rights have disappeared
completely, and what was formerly considered unreasonable is now
reasonable. There is no doubt we sometimes face unimaginable
threats, and we should be vigilant in trying to guard against them.
However, some emerging passenger screening technologies, such as
backscatter x-rays, have the ability to intrude too far and should be
considered unreasonable searches if used as a primary screening tool.
We must never lose sight of the Fourth Amendment privacy rights
Americans hold dear.
